It has been stated many times: traditionally, medical history was written by, for and about doctors, telling the story of unilinear scientific progress. Positivism tended to look at the history of medicine as a process of linear progress from religion through metaphysics to science, in which mankind was liberated from superstition and irrationality. This view was confirmed by the Weberian notion of a "disenchantment" of the world: in the course of the last few centuries, the influence of magic and animism was seen as having declined. In the field of medical thinking and medical practice, man was thought to have freed himself from the chains of superstition. Gradually, he had learned to relate to the world in rational terms; in the event of illness, academic doctors were the logical engineers of his body. However, the times of the grand stories are over, in general as well as in medical history. With non-physicians moving into the field, there has been a growing awareness of the constructed nature of medicine.1 Medical knowledge has come to be seen as functioning within a specific cultural context from which it derives its meaning.2 Today, illness is no longer considered to be a universal, ontological unit. Instead, the meaning of illness-as well as the response to it-is thought to be determined by factors of a social, economic, political and religious nature.3
disenchantment. It would imply the virtual disappearance of non-orthodox healing in the twentieth century, whereas the opposite proves to be the case. 4 In 1993, at the request of the Ministry of Health, the Dutch Health Council published a report on the nature and position of alternative medicine in the Netherlands. It showed that alternative ways of healing are still very important today, both in terms of the number of patient-healer contacts and in the money involved. At the end of the twentieth century, faith-healing, homoeopathy, pilgrimages, acupuncture and anthroposophy-to name but a few-are still important healing options.5 This need not surprise us when we look at the conceptual side of the matter. The suggestion that went with positivism and disenchantment theories was that "rationality" is an unproblematic concept that coincides with science. However, as the social history of medicine has made clear, science is but oneform of rationality. If a belief is rational when it is considered coherent by those who hold it, magical behaviour can be highly rational. In other words, what is considered rational in one context can be rejected as being non-rational in another.6 Since people in the late twentieth century keep on trying to make sense of illness and suffering in a "non-rational" way, the conclusion should be that the enchantment continues.
The implications of the constructivist perspective in medical history are far-reaching. Gone are the days of nice, well-organized narratives of the struggle of mankind to wrench the secrets out of nature in order to end suffering and illness. Gone too are the times when relationships within the realm of health care seemed clear: on the one hand, academic medicine-rational, modest and humanitarian-on the other, humbug and wilful deceit. Scientific heroes have fallen from their pedestals; they have been reduced to common mortals, who produced certain benefits for society.7 Meaning in the field of illness-and healing is no longer considered to be the monopoly of orthodox medicine. Instead, it is seen as arbitrary and contingent and dependent on contextual factors. In order to find out how patient behaviour is conditioned, each particular context will have to be examined. This pulverizing of the traditional historical image has often been deplored. However, by analysing the construction of quackery and folk medicine in Dutch historiography, I hope to make clear that the discipline has only gained from its renewal. 8 The social history of medicine likes to describe health care systems in terms of a medical market.9 It is an attractive heuristic perspective, since it is much more dynamic 4 See, for example, Willem de Blecourt, ' Groniek, 1995, 29: 132-55 . 9 Matthew Ramsey, Professional and popular medicine in France, 1770-1830: the social world of medical practice, Cambridge University Press, 1988;  than the traditional one. From the point of view of the patient-the demand side-the medical market can be considered as the spectrum of healing options, ranging from selfhelp to consulting a professional healer. From that of the healer-the supply side-the concept focuses on specialization, popularity and competition. However, although the concept has introduced economics into the field of health care, its cultural dimension may be even more important:
The medical market was the arena where the effectiveness and success of a bid for trust and of the language that was used to ask for trust, were put to the test. Whether a cultural repertoire of illness was accepted by other people could only be established at this meeting point between healers, patients and other interested parties.'0
In the medical market different knowledge claims and healing practices struggled for recognition. Consultation behaviour was highly dependent on trust, belief and esteem on behalf of the patient. How was demand for medical advice created? And, once created, how was it canalized? If health care is a battlefield where the favour of the patient is the bounty,'" it is crucial to have an understanding of the mechanisms of in-and exclusion.
Or, to put it differently: what constituted good medical treatment and who was to decide?
In a slightly different context, it has been remarked that the task of the historian is not so much to trace the accumulation of scientific knowledge as to understand the organization of knowledge.'2 This article charts the attempts to locate quackery and folk medicine-thereby organizing knowledge and shaping the medical market-in Dutch historiography. Since there are no self-evident or universal boundaries separating science from magic and superstition-or, for that matter, orthodox medicine from quackery and folk medicine-it is not about "real" quacks but about constructed or conceived ones. Physicians have always felt the need to draw a demarcation line between their own discipline and non-medicine. This not only implied the creation of a professional selfimage, but an image of the "medical other" as well.13 However, although there have been many attempts to disqualify alternative conceptions of illness and healing as irrational and irrelevant, it will become clear that physician-medical historians never formed a monolithic group of quack-bashers. Positivists are often said to look at folk medicine and quackery as a residue of a magical, superstitious past on the verge of disappearing. They have been depicted as Whiggish, one-dimensional and historically naive. This, as I will try to make clear, is a caricature made by a young discipline-the social history of medicine-that wanted a place under the sun. The older medical historians each put history to a different use, depending on their position in time and society. Accordingly, folk medicine and quackery played a different role in their historical narrative. With regard to the style and contents of medical historiography written by physicians, I would like to propose a typology of three. First, there was the learned physician, who was well-versed in Greek and Latin and who still thought very much along the philological lines of medical humanism. Representatives of this type were rooted in the so-called pragmatic tradition, whose "founding father" was Kurt Sprengel. They used medical history as a didactic instrument in universities. Second, there was the bridgebuilding physician, who was aware of the major epistemological transformation medicine had gone through in the course of the nineteenth century. He was eager to bridge the gap between the two cultures (science and the humanities) and between the doctor and the patient that had resulted from it. The most important representative of this type was Theodor Puschmann. Third, there was the scientist-physician and educator of the people, who was proud of the achievements of medical science and demanded a social position for physicians that would match these developments. He wanted to persuade lay-people of the extraordinary value of academic medicine, denouncing all heterodoxy. What united all three was their evolutionary perspective on the history of medicine, with outspoken positivist traits.
The History of Medical Ideas in the Academic Curriculum Medical history as an autonomous discipline has its roots in the early nineteenth century with the German professor of medicine Kurt Sprengel (1766-1833) as its founding father. 14 With his five-volume Versuch einer pragmatische Geschichte der Arzneykunde, which appeared from 1792 onwards, he made medical history explicitly subservient to medical education. Medicine was considered to be an integral part of general culture that was held to be one and indivisible. Progress in medicine, thought to be inescapable, reflected general historical developments. Therefore, medical history should not describe the endless multiformity of medical ideas in the past, but should rather make an effort to find and understand the historical patterns that lay behind them. Starting from the assumption that one can learn from the past, Sprengel and his followers, like Isensee and Haeser, primarily attributed an educational function to medical history. In the medical curriculum, they wanted to offer the history of civilization condensed in the history of medicine. This would not only make the student a better physician, but a valuable and right-minded member of society as well. Because Because Ali Cohen and Israels-like Isensee and Haeser-dealt with medical teaching at university level and not with medical practice, folk medicine and quackery were not issues in their historiography. Although Ali Cohen, being a health inspector, came into contact with quackery quite often,'9 in his publications it seems to have been a non-issue for him. In his Handboek der openbare gezondheidsregeling en der geneeskundige politie (Handbook on public health care), for example, he discussed foodstuffs, housing, occupational medicine, epidemiology, and medical inspection, but not quackery.20 Being fully preoccupied with the building of a new system of medical education, the work of Ali Cohen and Israels primarily shows how a new, scientific self-image of the profession was being created and how the pioneers of the profession believed medical knowledge should be organized. In short, they were far from the cliche of quack-bashers that the social history of medicine has made of all nineteenth-century physician-medical historians. In the 1920s and 1930s, Jan Gerard de Lint (1867-1936) worked in a similar vein. In 1924, he became a private lecturer in the history of medicine at Leiden University. In 1933, he published a Dutch translation of Sigerist's Einfuihrung in die Medizin.21 Like the handbooks mentioned above, it was aimed at teaching the principles of medicine as a science, drawing examples from the past.
The History of Folk Medicine and Communicating Illness
After the transformation of medicine in the nineteenth century, a split in medical historiography occurred: one branch sought to reconcile the differences that resulted from the "scientification" of medicine, while the other emphasized them. When Israels died in 1883, no successor was appointed to the chair of medical history. Due to the transformation in medicine and in university teaching in general during these years, the value of history for medical students was appreciated less and less.22 Traditional ideals of humanistic learning had come under attack and medicine began to model itself on scientific standards. The clinic and the laboratory replaced the library as medicine's most important research centres. Israels had been part of a generation that still felt strong ties with the past. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, these ties were cut. The traditional ideal of the universitas litterarum was undermined, and medicine was no longer the unified discipline it once had been. This seriously threatened the legitimacy of medical history. The introduction of scientific methods in medicine led to a break between the present and the past that deprived pragmatic historiography of its ratio. Someone like Claude Bernard, the great French experimental physiologist, once remarked he felt a great distance from the past of medicine.23
In 1889 Theodor Puschmann (1844-1899), professor in the history of medicine in Vienna, put forward a plea for medical history that was to have great repercussions.24 He shared Sprengel's views on medical history but, at the same time, was very aware that medicine had changed profoundly. This was, however, no reason to neglect its history. Quite the contrary: the changes made the need for history more compelling than ever. Puschmann wanted to preserve the blessings of modern scientific research without losing sight of the demands of the art of medicine. Anyone who knew the history of his own discipline would never slip into an attitude of easy and superficial materialism. To the history of medicine he assigned three functions: it formed the basis of professional knowledge, it contributed to the refinement of the character of physicians, and it completed general education. Using history, he hoped to maintain unity in medical knowledge and culture at large.
Puschmann's address stirred up a discussion that led to the appointment of professors in medical history throughout western Europe, one physicians from the public. Their relationship could be restored by studying folk medicine from the present and academic medicine from the past, which Van Andel considered as two expressions of the same thing. In his thesis, Volksgeneeskunst in Nederland (Folk medicine in the Netherlands), Van Andel presented modem folk medicine as having its roots in Graeco-Roman medicine.34 According to him, folk medicine is not a scientific system, but "a product of intuition, experience, faith, tradition and fantasy". In folk medicine, magico-animistic notions from the beginning of our culture that enable man to cope with fear and anxiety can still be found. Both medical history and folk medicine point at "the unity of feelings towards the dangers of our earthly existence".35 For Van Andel, they were part of the universal condition humaine. As such, he considered both disciplines essential for the practising physician. In their work, Van Andel and Bakker showed an awareness of and a sensitivity to the complexities of the relationship between patient and healer and between regular and irregular medicine. In their treatment of folk medicine, they used positivism in an ingenious way. By arguing that folk medicine was based on rudiments of Graeco-Roman medicine, popular belief was made both strange and familiar at the same time. It was backward because it lagged behind in development but, on the other hand, it was cast in the highly understandable terms of humoralism. A physician, when not patronizing, could put his knowledge of folk medicine to great therapeutical effect. In short, the second type of medical historian was seeking to reconcile the split between science and the humanities so as to bridge the resultant gap between physician and patient. Being practising physicians, they wanted to restore communication and mutual understanding in the consulting room in a confusing transitional period.
The History of Quackery and the Struggle for the Patient There was a second response to the transformation of medicine in the nineteenth century. Unlike Van Andel, De Lint and Bakker, authors of this type did not try to bridge the epistemological split between physicians and laymen, but rather emphasized it. They set themselves up as educators of the people, who possessed expert knowledge. The public was considered incompetent and incapable of correct judgement in medical matters. This applied not only to members of the lower strata of society, but to the rich and the intelligent as well: they all consulted quacks. Writers of this type had two goals: first, they wanted to unmask quacks and expose them to the public in all their nakedness, and second, they wanted to persuade the public to accept scientific medical discourse as superior. They were convinced medical science held a promise for the future and they wanted to win over the public to their belief in progress. It was considered imperative to publicize the potential of science. The public was rebuked for its anthropomorphic way of 40 to strengthen a weak stomach. Laxatives especially were very popular with the public. In a bitter tone, the Bruinsmas commented that the principle of well-known quacks like Thomas Holloway seemed to be "the more defecation, the better". The brothers presented chemical analyses of more than fifty secret remedies. Some of them turned out to be mere foodstuffs, some did not contain any active ingredients at all, and others proved to be downright poisonous. Moreover, many remedies required self-diagnosis by the patient, which the brothers considered unacceptable. At all times the expert opinion of a doctor was needed, in order to prevent damage being done. The Bruinsmas went to great lengths to prove the misleading nature of testimonials of successful treatment. They investigated some 100 German testimonials-many of which proved to be false-and sent the results of their inquiries to 230 newspapers in order to persuade them never to include quack advertisements again. Their indictment ended with suggestions for improving medical legislation and with an appeal to the state for the stricter prosecution of quacks. In 1880, two years after publishing their book, the Bruinsma brothers founded the Dutch Society Against Quackery, with which they fought their campaign on a regular basis.49 They published a monthly newsletter, in which they exposed quacks and printed the results of chemical analyses of medicines.50 The aim of the Society was fully in line with that of the Society for the Common Benefit, in which they both participated: the enlightenment of the people through the popularization of science.
Medical history did not play a role in the Bruinsmas' arguments, quite the opposite. Unlike many others, they explicitly contrasted the traditional charlatan with the modern quack.51 To many people, the screaming market vendor was still the archetype of the quack, and they were therefore not on the alert for the creeping evil of modern quackery, which was extensive, commercial and anonymous. For the Bruinsmas, Holloway was the emblematic modern quack. He was deceitful, his only objective being to make money out of selling his factory products on a large scale. The degree of organization of his company was unprecedented. All over the world he had branches, sales representatives and hawkers. The success of this arch-quack had opened the eyes of many shrewd merchants, especially in America, and incited their entrepreneurial spirit. For 1940 , Droogleever Fortuyn expounded his views on the course of history.54 He said that an evolution had taken place that ran from folk belief (based on good-natured empirical experience) via quackery (conscious deceit) to medicine (synonymous with true knowledge). The first two stages he associated with subjectivity, hope, lay knowledge and stagnation, the latter with objectivity, rationality, expertise, progress and humanity. Droogleever Fortuyn followed in the tradition of the Bruinsmas, whom he praised as pioneers and unselfish fighters who had devoted much time and energy to combating quackery. Like them, he showed that modem patients lacked an adequate understanding of academic medicine; like them, he attached great importance to informing the lay public, and like them, he advocated stricter legislation and legal prosecution. After having investigated magnetism, terrestrial beams, somnambulism, astrology, faith healing, exorcism, uroscopy, osteopathy, chiropractic and iridiagnosis, Droogleever Fortuyn concluded that quackery and superstition were not rooted in solid science. He stated that irregular healers, exactly like their patients, only paid attention to their clients' complaints but remained in the dark about the real pathogens. Superstition was based on fear combined with hope. It occurred when man felt helpless in the face of threatening forces and it could be made to disappear through science.
Using the history of medicine-the "long and hard struggle with the secrets of life"55 Droogleever Fortuyn drew lines of demarcation between regular and irregular medical practitioners, each with their own tradition. For medicine, it had been a long and difficult quest for the truth, that had led from the Greek Pantheon via Hippocrates and Galen, and via Vesalius, Pare and Harvey to nineteenth-and twentieth-century heroes like Jenner, Auenbrugger, Laennec, Semmelweis, Lister, Virchow, Pasteur, Rontgen, Ehrlich and Von Behring. The growth in scientific knowledge was accompanied by a growth in humanity (with Pinel and Nightingale being his champions). Combined, they stood for "victory over pemicious quackery, over the distasteful remedies of folk medicine, over ignorance and incompetence".56 According to Droogleever Fortuyn, information on modem medicine, characterized by science, humanity and therapeutical success, was the key to enlightening the public. Therefore, information on the nature and power of medicine should be made available in schools, libraries and waiting rooms, and through newspapers, the cinema, the theatre, the radio, and the publication of brochures and booklets.
In the thirties, another group of physicians was active that can be situated somewhere between Van ways in which social relationships found an expression in illness, health and healing and in the organization of health care systems. At the same time, the counter-culture of the 1960s had bred an anti-science sentiment. At a time of a growing environmental awareness and of uneasiness about technology, the value of science for mankind was brought into debate. This critical attitude led to a revaluation of the history of science that had helped to create the positive image of science.62 Because unconditional belief in science was wavering, eyes were opened to the role the older medical history had played in legitimating the monopoly of physicians in the medical market. 63 Historians, sociologists and anthropologists entered the field, looking at the history of illness, pain and healing from a non-medical perspective. Broadly speaking, they argued that (historical) reality is contingent and that medical history had merely stylized the past in order to serve contemporary needs and interests.64 New medical history did not take orthodox medicine as a frame of reference. Instead, it studied the whole spectrum of ideas, notions and practices with regard to health and illness, borrowing its methods from the sociology of knowledge and (medical) anthropology. Anthropology had made it clear that healing practices are always culture bound. They originate in daily life, are tested and modified, and develop into cultural codes that help to make sense of illness, and to guide illness and consultation behaviour. Biological determinism and ontological illness concepts were abandoned, while the intellectual and social status of healers was considered to be the outcome of the interaction between social, political and economic forces and of "negotiations" between the parties involved.65
Because the contents and boundaries of medicine were not considered to be clear-cut, the approach to "folk medicine" and "quackery" was subject to change as well. The new attitude exposed the blind spots of conventional medical history. When society instead of medicine was taken as a frame of reference, it became clear that "alternative medicine" did not represent the dark side of medicine, but rather shed light on a whole spectrum of social, "non-medical" topics. It was found that theories on illness and healing could be expressions of political protest, religious fervour or simply a lifestyle.66 It became clear that it is difficult to generalize about alternative medicine in the way that traditional historiography did. When the above-mentioned Dutch historians are looked at again, the explicit labelling activity of Van Andel attracts attention. He distinguished between orthodox medicine, popular medicine, folk medicine and quackery.67 Popular medicine he defined as popularized orthodox medicine. It referred to advice given by academic physicians to the public through leaflets, brochures and public lectures. He considered folk medicine to be an autonomous ensemble of ideas and practices that was supported by the people. He presented it as an integrated system that enabled laymen to act on their own initiative in the event of illness, without external medical advice. Folk medicine differed from popular medicine in that it used obsolete remedies. It was thought to be empirical and experience-based, whereas academic medicine was considered to be rational and consistent. On the whole, however, folk medical advice was given in good faith. This could not be said of quackery, which was presented as conscious and wilful fraud by Van Andel, its essence being financial gain not humanitarianism. The difference between folk medicine and quackery was that folk medicine was unselfish, whereas quackery was essentially commercial.68
In this context, it is interesting to look again at Van Andel's remark, "the folk remedies of today are the scientific ones of yesterday".69 The anthropologist Willem de Blecourt, who has done much research on irregular healers in the Netherlands, has pointed out that the boundaries Van Andel has constructed between folk medicine and quackery have less to do with their actual content than with medical politics.70 By implication, the same applies to the distinction between regular and irregular healers.71 Some irregulars were rendered harmless by the use of the label "folk healer", which projected them back to an innocent "world we have lost". Van Andel's comment on folk remedies makes them familiar and puts them at a distance (in development) while, at the same time, rendering them harmless. Therefore, De Blecourt looks at the historiography of Van Andel and Bakker as an accompanying phenomenon of medical professionalization. Something similar can be said about the Bruinsma brothers and Droogleever Fortuyn. From the difficulty they had in making sense of quackery and in understanding why the public ignored their information and persisted in consulting quacks, we can conclude that their outlook on both medicine and history was too simplistic. Their frustrations seem to have originated in the paradox of positivism: on the one hand, modem science was claimed to be superior, while, on the other, not everyone seemed to be convinced of this.72 Moreover, not all irregulars were as highly organized as Holloway. In fact many of them did not actively confront or defy orthodox medicine or try to swindle the public, but simply tried to make a handful of sous by organizing a somnambulistic seance, by fortune telling, or by treating patients in some other way. Their healing activities very often stemmed from their poor social condition. 73 The change of course that medical history has taken in the last few decades has demolished the historic image of the heroic battle of medicine against suffering and disease without putting a consistent image in its place. It has been argued that medical history no longer has a story to offer, but only approaches.74 Some people regret this situation, in which incommensurable narratives seem to exist side by side, while others react with outright hostility, physicians and non-physicians denouncing each others' methods and narratives.75 However, it seems to me that historical pluralism should not be suppressed but, rather, welcomed and adjusted to the subject's advantage. The difference in narrative sheds light on presentist preoccupations, the agenda determining the contents of the story as well as the identity of the "implicit reader". Whereas Ali Cohen and Israels were teachers addressing themselves to their students, Van Andel and Bakker wanted to get an exchange of ideas going among practising physicians on the doctor-patient relationship. The Bruinsmas and Droogleever Fortuyn sought to mobilize support for stricter medical legislation while, last but not least, historians and anthropologists have elaborated on a whole range of social topics from the perspective of illness and healing. In the process, they have made us aware of the constructed nature of both medical and historical knowledge. Historiography can never hope to present the ultimate truth; in this sense, the discipline has lost its innocence for good. However, by comparing the style and content of the different narratives about the past with the social interests, disciplinary backgrounds and political agendas of their authors, it can make an important contribution to our understanding of medicine and its place in society.
